Rock-Paper-Scissors; A New and Elegant Proof

I provide an elegant proof identifying the unique mixed Nash equilibrium of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game. The proof is based on intuition rather than elimination of cases. It shows that for any mixed strategy other than the one that puts equal probability on each of a player’s actions, it holds that this strategy is not a best response to any mixed strategy that is a best response to it.

Axiomatization of Ratio Equilibria in Public Good Economies.

Using consistency properties, we characterize the cost-sharing scheme arising from the ratio equilibrium concept for economies with public goods. The characterization turns out to be surprisingly simple and direct. In contrast to most axiomatic characterizations based on reduced games and consistency properties, our characterization requires that in the reduced game, the players take as given the proportions of the costs paid by the members of the complementary player set, rather than their utility levels.COSTS ; PUBLIC GOODS ; GAMES

An axiomatization of the Euclidean compromise solution

The Euclidean compromise solution in multicriteria optimization is a solution concept that assigns to a feasible set the alternative with minimal Euclidean distance to the utopia point The purpose of this paper is to provide a characterization of the Euclidean compromise solutio

Proportionate flow shop games

htmlabstractIn a proportionate flow shop problem several jobs have to be processed through a fixed sequence of machines and the processing time of each job is equal on all machines. By identifying jobs with agents, whose costs linearly depend on the completion time of their jobs, and assuming an initial processing order on the jobs, we face two problems: the first one is how to obtain an optimal order that minimizes the total processing cost, the second one is how to allocate the cost savings obtained by ordering the jobs optimally. In this paper we focus on the allocation problem. PFS games are defined as cooperative games associated to proportionate flow shop problems. It is seen that PFS games have a nonempty core. Moreover, it is shown that PFS games are convex if the jobs are initially ordered in decreasing urgency. For this case an explicit game independent expression for the Shapley value is provid